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Abstract
The blockchain technology offers a novel mode of
distributed authentication, which does not depend on a
central authority. We consider this novelty against established governance modes. We illustrate our argument by
paying special attention to blockchain-based authentication functions in the empirical domain of land registries
across the world. Based on interviews with representatives from organizations deploying blockchain, and content analysis of related grey literature, we discuss established governance idealtypes against what the rivalry
that cryptocurrencies and blockchains bring to digital
settings. After referring to market, hierarchy, network,
and bazaar, we conclude outlining the prospects of a different, blockchain-related governance mode called
‘tribal’ that better captures the ‘togetherness’ which rivalry originates.

1. Introduction
If one copies and distributes music, it is still music. If
one can copy and distribute money, it is not money anymore. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin proved at scale
blockchain functionalities, which introduce rivalry into
digital environments via distributed authentication. This
capacity of authentication is relevant for governance purposes because it introduces a sense of togetherness due
to shared interest. This is different from other information goods and the organizational forms they brought
about.
Rather than grounded theorizing, or taking its move
from existing blockchain literature - which is reviewed
in the following paragraph - this article aims at problematizing the well-established typology of modes of governance initiated by Williamson [1] and Powell [2] on
the basis of the emerging phenomenon of blockchains.
More precisely, the bazaar governance [3], which formalizes digital governance defined by openness and nonrivalry of information goods and exemplified by free and
open source software (FOSS), is considered under the
light of blockchain architectures and their consequences
in use. We argue that the bazaar misses relevant aspects
of blockchain-related phenomena. On the basis of this
mismatch and illustrations from empirical domains, we
propose a different mode of governance which we name
‘tribal’. The reference to tribes accounts both for a mode
of governance not defined by the rule of law, and for the
togetherness that rivalry introduces into the open and
common pastures of digital fields.
In the research domain about governance through IT,
as distinct from governance of IT, this paper looks at the
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former and takes a narrow focus on authentication. Authentication is here intended in its basic meaning of certification of genuinity. Against the background of information openness and abundance, typical of open information infrastructures, we claim that the major information management innovation introduced by blockchain - and proved viable at scale by Bitcoin - is distributed authentication. We illustrate it relying on cases of
actual implementations for land registration.
In open networks like the internet, the governance
problem is at the fringes. Since there is no way to seal
boundaries to define who is in and who is out, then to
control them, open networks are constantly exposed to
malicious actors. So, openness is generative both of innovations and misconducts [4]. This polarization depends on architectural openness and on nearly zero marginal cost for replication and distribution, which in turn
made IT unsuitable for native digital money (i.e. without
external and non-digital guarantor). That is because, of
course, money must not be replicable (i.e. counterfeitable).
The blockchain circumvents this limit of IT and
brings rivalry into the digital environment. It proved rivalry viable by making transactions public and by letting
the 51% of computing power (there are alternatives) to
authenticate honest transactions. In practice, Bitcoins (or
tokens more generally) cannot be replicated because authenticated transactions locate any token and differentiate it from any other. From another angle, Bitcoin tested
at scale a rewarding mechanism for keeping faceless and
globally dispersed actors honest when operating on this
open network. For such reasons, open (often referred to
as ‘permissionless’) blockchains are particularly interesting for governance issues: they promise to scale easily
for positive network externalities, but they are difficult to
manage because of lack of both formal organizational
structures and boundaries to police.
We place our interest in governance through blockchain against the broader background of progressive decoupling of formal organizations and large information
systems (or information infrastructures). For instance,
cloud computing has taken the control on IT out of IT
departments’ hands. Regarding blockchain, this move is
well exemplified by the independence of cryptocurrencies from nation-states and central banks.
To support the claim for a new governance mode
brought to the fore by blockchain implementations, the
remainder is organized as follows: first we identify the
cornerstones of our theoretical framework. It takes its
moves from studies on IT governance, then presents the
bazaar as a recent extension of the well-established
modes of governance typology by Powell [2]. We discuss the peculiarities that blockchain introduces against
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these established idealtypes, with a special attention for
the bazaar. In particular, we highlight how the rivalry that
blockchains introduce into digital environments originates a level of ‘togetherness’ among blockchain users
that does not manifest in information goods and native
digital organizing modes like FOSS. Then, after presenting the main works on actual implementations of blockchains, we outline our research methodology. The paper
continues with an illustration of blockchain implementations in the domain of land registries. In conclusion, we
discuss a mode of governance, which we name ‘tribal’,
that may better account for digital organizing when rivalry plays a relevant role.

ways power is being exercised through IT. The spectrum
of positions about IT and governance is wide and spans
from traditional managerial command and control approaches to international anarchy. Such diversity suggests that there are basic differences about the understanding of what IT are and how to govern through them.
So, we turn our attention to a classic of organization studies: Powell [2], in order to introduce and problematize
the ‘bazaar governance’ [3].

2.1. From Hierarchy to Bazaar Governance
According to Williamson [15] “governance is a
means by which to infuse order in a relation where potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to
realize mutual gains”. Williamson’s [1, 15, 16] core theoretical stance is that transactions entail uncertainty
about their outcome, due to the bounded rationality and
opportunism of agents. Thus, and as a means of reducing
transaction costs, agents implement a governance structure, which Williamson defined as “the explicit or implicit contractual framework within which a transaction
is located” quoted in [3]. This line of thinking is expanded by Watson et al. [17] who discuss it in digital domains, with an argument consistent to Surowiecki [18]
‘Wisdom of the Crowds’, informed by cases like FOSS,
Wikipedia and the likes.
As summarized in table 1, hierarchy refers to formal
organizations within which command lines and responsibilities are defined and stable. Market refers to atomic
actors who freely trade. As Williamson [16] put it: “firms
are islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market
relations.” Powell [2] picked on this dichotomy and argued that market logics may operate within hierarchies
(incentives, for instance) and hierarchies onto markets.
So, he proposed the network as a new idealtype, which
is most suited to domains where measurements are difficult and trust among parties has a paramount role.
Demil and Lecocq’s [3] study proposes to add a
fourth idealtype, named ‘bazaar governance’, to Powell’s [2] tripartite categorization of governance forms.
Their work, based on FOSS production, found that Powell’s threefold characterization was not satisfactory to explain the then booming phenomenon of FOSS, and by
extension the information economy, so they proposed
the bazaar idealtype.
FOSS took the hegemony over the internet not only
by ignoring much of the received wisdom about IT governance, but also projecting the possibilities of open collaboration beyond software development. For instance,
voluntary geographic information (and user-generated
content more broadly) has shown that formal expert organizations are not the only way of getting things done;
consumer electronics and open internet services have replaced business technologies in leading the ways of innovation; crowdfunding has unveiled the blindspots of
traditional investors’ preferences.
.

2. Theoretical Framework
As anticipated, the new architecture introduced and
tested at scale by Bitcoin is about authenticating transactions, thus certifying the reliability of it as a public ledger.
From another perspective, blockchains introduce rivalry
in the online domain: to avoid the double-spending problem, each token of a currency must be identifiable and
owned by someone and not anyone else at the same time.
The opening example clarifies: if I pass a music file on
to someone else, we both can listen to it and it remains
music. Instead, if we both can own the same bitcoin, it
would not work as money anymore.
The digitally native way of authenticating something
introduces rivalry and constitutes a qualitative shift in
digital environments. Copies are not all the same as they
used to be. This is fostered by the open nature of the
Bitcoin blockchain where no single node can be held accountable due to its distributed nature [5, 6]. Traditional
jurisdictions thereby may act as a mediating entity in
case of disputes only to the extent concerned parties accept it. Since jurisdictions have never been intended as a
service to use as one pleases, basic questions about what
social contract underpins blockchain organizing forms
are legit to ask [7].
The term IT Governance has been used since the
early 1990s [8, 9] and became more prominent later in
the decade [10], [11], [12]. Later, IT governance was defined by Weill and Ross [13] as the framework for decision rights and accountabilities to encourage desirable
behavior in the use of IT. In Weill and Ross’s [13] framework, political idealtypes are used to describe how people in the enterprise make key decisions. Their quite articulated conceptualization is too precise, thus inflexible,
to be applicable to blockchains, especially permissionless, which remain in constant flux, do not have actors in
the position of fully exercising decision rights, nor clear
mechanisms and rules to achieve objectives (a clear example is the never-ending unruly conflict about Bitcoin
blocksize). So, while we maintain our focus on IT and
governance, we need to move to theories that relate more
to actual use.
The recent book by Musiani et al. [14] looks at social and political sciences to account both for the elusiveness to control that the Internet and the services based on
it showed to traditional decision makers, and for new

2
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Table 1. Governance idealtypes adapted from Powell [2] and Demil and Lecocq [3]. The last column in italics on the right is an anticipation of our
proposal for a novel governance idealtype which we named ‘tribal’. It is discussed in the last part of this paper.

Features

Explanation

Market

Hierarchy

Network

Bazaar

Tribal

Contract
Framework

Legal framework for
transaction

Classical
contract1

Employment
contract

Neoclassical
contract2

Open license contract

(Until now) Post-hoc: a
record if/when needed

Coordination
Mechanism

Means of governing
exchanges

Price

Formal line
of authority

Embedded
relations

Product

Adherence to the technical
protocol

Normative basis

Market
exchanges

Forbearance

Exchanges

Openness and fairness

Consensus-based

Irrelevant

Irrelevant

Relevant

Partially relevant

Pseudonym-based

Nature of incentives

Main regulatory
force
Degree to which
identity of parties
matters
Incentives for transacting parties

Competition

Status

Reciprocity

Reputation

Hoarding (for currencies)
Reliability (for records)

Incentives Intensity

Agent’s motivation
to contribute

High

Low

Intermediate

Low

High

Control Intensity

Capacity to enforce
regulations

Low

High

Intermediate

Low

Low from the outside
Intermediate from inside

Identity of parties

These peculiarities of digital governance are formalized by Demil and Lecocq, who relied on the initial
ideas by Raymond [19]. Indeed, the label bazaar derives from Raymond’s [19] work who contrasted it to
the traditional approach to software development, likened to a ‘cathedral’.
The bazaar mode of governance is defined by
open licenses, which allow unrestricted access to the
source code and prevent anyone to appropriate and
trade on software ownership. This reduces substantially the transaction cost of FOSS. The consequent
governance mode is based on openness and transparency: software developers build up their reputation,
which they can then spend providing assistance on the
software they know [20]. Overall, like in a bazaar, both
direct incentives and controls are low. In fact, the bazaar clearly differs from hierarchies because there are
no defined organizational structures along which command and control lines can be used to regulate behaviors. It also differs from markets because open source
licenses do not grant anyone with exclusive ownership
rights, thus software cannot be traded as a commodity
for direct profit. Finally, it differs from networks because membership and associations are fluid, and selection does not happen at the entry points.
Since their study pinpoints to some peculiarities of
digital organizing, we thought of studying to what extend the bazaar helps explaining another rapidly
emerging phenomenon: blockchains. We found
strengths and weaknesses. In the first place, we find
that their focus on transaction cost and copyleft as a peculiar kind of contract are reductive. Rivalry and trust
appear, respectively, more prominent.

2.2. Authentication and Rivalry

1

2

Like any other FOSS project, the source code of
most blockchain software is publicly available for anyone to check, use, develop and redistribute it. In spite
of these apparent similarities, there are remarkable differences between open-source applications like web
browsers or word processors and blockchains. Blockchains, by authenticating some data against the rest, introduce rivalry to the digital environment, which has
always been characterized by infinite replicability, thus
plentitude. In short, before the blockchain, all copies
were the same. With blockchain it has become possible
to differentiate something from something else (like
who owns a bitcoin) without relying on non-digital authorities. This property of the blockchains underneath
cryptocurrencies is allowing to move from openness
and gift economy, well exemplified by FOSS, to a digitally native economy, at the expenses of the non-rivalry that used to characterize information goods. This
establishes a novel link between distributed authentication and modes of governance.
Concretely, if at some point any open source web
browser users is dissatisfied with the software, they can
decide to fork the code and develop an independent
version to fit their own and new users’ preferences.
When this happens, users of both versions maintain the
capacity to use their software for most if not all browsing purposes. This is not the case with blockchains,
whose main purpose is to guarantee the authenticity of
the data they gather. When a fork takes place, data on
the forked ledgers may differ and the reliability they
offer be hampered [21].
To clarify this point, let us consider the most developed blockchain: Bitcoin. All Bitcoin transactions
are authenticated and recorded on one public ledger
maintained by all miners. Because of the increasing

Based on Demil and Lecocq [3]: In classical contract law,
transacting parties identity is irrelevant and their dependence
slight.

Further [3]: In neoclassical contracts, hybrid organizations remain autonomous but bilaterally dependent and their identities
matters.
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in Powell’s networks as the glue that guarantees reciprocity. Trust is a key factor and is also described as the
primary governance mechanism for dyadic or network
exchange relationships [2]. Trust does not only minimize transaction costs, but also creates value (with enhanced information sharing) for such relationship [24].
The reputational nature of bazaar incentives works
only to the extent participants trust a fair allocation of
resources down the line.
Rivalry might make think that actors do not trust
each other, nor the whole system. This stance is misleading. It is not uncommon to read claims that blockchains are trustless. This proves quite narrow if one
considers that no one is forced to use blockchains. So,
users and/or organizations do trust them to the extent
they use them, including pouring real money. In permissioned blockchain trust is, at the very least, posed
in those who are in charge of policing the access points.
Having said that, it is reasonable to accept that blockchain introduces a way to trade without intermediaries
with unknown people, whom we may not trust individually. This is what we call faceless trust.
We turn to Gambetta’s [25] formalization of the
concept of trust, quoted by Lustig and Nardi [26], to
conceptualize it as a central concepts for blockchainrelated governance. According to him, trust is the subjective sense that one has about another performing a
particular course of action, with consequences for the
former, without being monitored. Trust is, therefore,
there to bridge over the uncertainty about the future
[27]. Trust in authenticity of transactions reduce the reliance on traders’ subjectivity.
Although trust appears central for blockchains,
there are no studies yet that focus on the mutual relations between blockchains and trust. Blockchain technology refers to transfer of trust from offline to online
domain, or to the emergence of trustworthy relations
where there were none or weak. In contrast to classical
way of perceiving trust in online relationships [28],
trust in blockchain technology does not require thirdparty guarantees or any third party at all. Therefore,
blockchain-enabled trust can be seen as faceless, meaning that there is no actor who plays the role of a trustee.
The tribal governance mode we propose offers a framework for future studies in this direction.

number of Bitcoin transactions, the blockchain manifested bottlenecks in authenticating all of them in a
timely fashion. Some developers have proposed solving this problem by modifying the software to increase
the blocksize, but the miners who were making money
out of the high transaction costs granted by the status
quo, opposed it. Unlike with the web browser example,
this is where Bitcoin manifests a substantive mismatch
with the bazaar idealtype: miners have a prominent role
in maintaining network integrity and reliability, so they
have unprecedented power. Indeed, the fork of the software, which happened in August 2017, created two distinct blockchains each one maintained by different
miners. Bitcoins attached to one cannot be traded on
the other any longer. Whereas a forked browser is usable for the whole Web. So, while forked browsers retain their use value quite independently from the fork
size, Bitcoin use value depends on mining capacity and
trade mass. Hence, compared to FOSS projects, public
distributed ledgers show a level of togetherness that affects all involved actors (end users, miners, companies,
regulators, etc.). This togetherness is more defining
than open licenses, which define the bazaar idealtype.
These differences from FOSS are explained by the
actors involved and the rules governing their relationships. Bitcoin involves a number of significant players
that together guarantee its blockchain consistency
across time and space. First, a relatively small group of
core developers is responsible for new code; this is
common to FOSS. Second, a relatively large number
of miners authenticate transactions so they are properly
executed and no double spending is allowed. Then,
there are the many users who trade in Bitcoin and may
have little knowledge or interest into its underlying
functioning. Still, by trading fiat money for Bitcoins,
they affect massively its valuation level, thus the financial incentives for everyone involved. Therefore, even
if copyleft licenses are adopted for blockchains, they
are not as determinant for governance as Demil and
Lecocq [3] claim they are for other FOSS projects.
Secondly, the centrality that Demil and Lecocq [3]
accord to transaction cost economics does not seem to
explain relevant aspects of blockchains. Starting from
Williamson [1], Demil and Lecocq [3] pose central attention onto the transaction cost economics, which discriminates between market and hierarchy. Even though
from other empirical domains, studies like Lucas and
Goh [22] as well as Garud and Munir [23] pose doubts
on emphasizing transaction cost. Trust was argued to
be central in networks and bazaar. In spite of recurrent
references to trustless transactions, we see trust as central for blockchains as well. This is explored in the following paragraph.

3. Current Research on Blockchain in Use
In recent years, Bitcoin first and blockchains later
have attracted wide-spread interest [31]. Of course,
computer scientists have been first movers to approach
this emerging phenomenon and proposing many variants of the architecture concept outlined by Nakamoto
[32]. In defining this literature review, we were interested in blockchains in actual use, not in publications
outlining the potentials of this new architecture, or possible improvements. Since empirical studies are still
sparse, our selection criterion left us with a relatively
small number of works to consider: not least because
of the long-time cycle of implementing IT, studying it,

2.3. Faceless Trust
Both the network and the bazaar modes of governance exceed the hierarchical and market modes of regulation and are explanatory of cases where trust plays
an important role. Trust is given paramount relevance
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and going through peer-review processes, we could not
find much academic literature based on studies of actually implemented and used blockchains in real-life settings. Consequently, despite our keen intention of differentiating between speculations about the potentials
of blockchain and actual uses, it was often difficult to
discriminate between what was aimed at by designers
and researchers from what was happening in practice.
Utilizing blockchains comes with the trust, or just
the assumption, in algorithms and their capacity of
governing organizational relations. Along this line,
Lustig and Nardi [26] dive into the Bitcoin phenomenon to investigate how algorithms have gained authority and legitimation in directing human activities by defining what information we rely upon. They criticize,
like Dodd [33] does, the emic views of people promoting Bitcoin for their naive assumptions about technological neutrality and independence from allegedly
corrupted politics. A similar approach can be seen in
the discussion on blockchain-based state governance
[34, 35]. Even if we agree that algorithms are not neutral in transforming human behaviors, organizations,
and societies, we find that a narrow focus on algorithms
does not account for novel aspects that blockchains
bring to the fore. Thus, this article takes a different
starting point: the rivalry that the blockchain architecture introduces by means of authentication, which miners maintain, and users rely upon and reinforce by using blockchains. Indeed, if we considered algorithms
solely, we would not see much difference between
open source software and blockchains, and the authentication they bring about by relying on miners and traders. This distinction is expanded upon later, when limits of the bazaar idealtype are discussed and tribal governance introduced.
Studies about governance often discuss issues of
jurisdiction, which remains uncertain here because the
responsibility for the genuinity of transactions has
shifted to allegedly independent miners or other consensus methods, which are located outside of formal
organizations’ and jurisdictions’ reach, which, therefore, are not easy to be held accountable [36]. As a consequence, legal uncertainty in transactions increases. A
way to mitigate this uncertainty are so-called smart
contracts, which gained popularity as well as controversy.
Traditional contracts reduce uncertainty by committing all signatories, who remain subject to the rule
of law. But blockchain may exceed jurisdictions, thus
fall in the cracks between inconsistent jurisdictions.
Dupont and Maurer [37] reflect on the applicability of
smart contracts and their relationship to law. It is
claimed that distributed, autonomous, and self-executing contracts are not feasible due to their non-contractual basis. Durkheim argues: “Wherever a contract exists, it is subject to regulation, which is the work of society and not of individuals”. Smart contracts are not
contracts, they are rather automatisms built on the top
of blockchain authentication [37]. Even if there is a
growing interest for smart contracts, we marginally

consider them here since they are envisioned as a layer
on the top of blockchains.
Morabito et al. [39] offer the most exhaustive overview of the state-of-the-art of blockchain in organizations. The salient cases presented there are Coinbase,
Everledger, Factom, eHealth and electricity management applications, finance and smart-contracts. Those
case-studies were useful to us navigating and putting in
perspective materials about the actual implementations
we found, and to decide who to contact directly. Interestingly, blockchain architecture is believed to fit into
fundamentally different domains in terms of scope or
transactional volume: from land registries to supply
chain management systems, from intellectual property
right management to money transfers and payments. In
all those domains, the incumbents are intermediaries or
third-party guarantors, which the blockchains aim at
substituting.
Walsh et al. [38] conducted a literature review to
gain an overview of blockchain characteristics, a necessary step to define blockchain types. Key blockchain
characteristics are: level of permission, restriction of
public access to data, modes of consensus, modularity,
scalability, interoperability, anonymity. Four possible
types emerge: Decentralized/Extensible (Bitcoin), Decentralized/Inextensible (Counterparty), Centralized/Extensible (Ripple), and Centralized/Inextensible
(R3). Empirical investigation is expected to uncover a
number of operational issues associated with different
types, e.g. issues of governance, political aspirations,
control, risk and resistance to change from those continuing to use traditional systems.
We could group other contributions according to
their focus on public services or private sector. From
the former, a case study in healthcare by Ekblaw et al.
[40] analyzes MedRec, a system that gives patients a
comprehensive, immutable log and easy access to their
medical information across providers and treatment
sites. Leveraging a blockchain, MedRec manages authentication, confidentiality, accountability, and data
sharing, all crucial considerations when handling
health data.
In the private sector, certainly the most developed
domain is finance, not least because of the Bitcoin experience. Morisse [41] surveys 42 papers about cryptocurrencies in terms of methods, concepts, and approaches and finds that cryptocurrencies had not
reached IS research, at least in 2015. Studies on security were more receptive of this emerging phenomenon. Herbert and Litchfield [42] research the application of property rights in the case of blockchain-based
software piracy prevention. Karame et al. [5] analyze
the probability of double-spending on the Bitcoin
blockchain and claim that the current Bitcoin log does
not provide sufficient information to provide sufficient
accountability, which would facilitate to blacklist malicious nodes.
Overall, Morabito et al. [39] warns about the risks
of privatizing state functions through blockchains as
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they contribute to “a process of undermining public institutions, the superiority of economics over politics,
and the change of citizens into to customers (…),
which perpetually empowers markets to the disadvantage of citizens”, which is in line with Atzori [34].

(2) digital identity of legal persons or tangible as well
as non-tangible assets, and (3) infrastructure provision
of data and transaction storage. In more detail, supply
chains, intellectual property rights, land registries, and
micro transactions are those areas where applications
have been released to "the wild". While we have systematically studied a total of two dozen applications in
four domains, space restrictions allow us only to describe the domain of land registries in this paper. Here,
we complemented a review of practitioner-based literature with interviews with high tier executives.
Scientific publications, practitioner’s reports, and
the interview data were fed into an iterative sense-making process: the authors coded and conceptualized the
information individually. Codes were initially seeded
by using concepts characterizing established governance mechanisms (i.e. market, hierarchy, network, bazaar). These individually gathered insights were then
discussed by all authors. We also exposed immediate
results and sought for input from the Coding Value research project. This input was then used to revisit the
data and further develop our concepts. The highest
level conceptual results is depicted in table 1 above,
where we contrast established governance mechanisms
with tribal governance. This iterative approach was finished when theoretical saturation was reached.

4. Method and Data Collection
Blockchain is a new technology and only recently
it has started to become applied outside the cryptocurrencies domain. Thus, it is time now to explore new
phenomena emerging when blockchains are being applied to societal and business problems. Blockchain
governance is such a new phenomenon. It is time to
check whether old models of how business is conducted, organized and governed appropriately describe
and explain blockchain-related governance. For this
matter, we reviewed related research with empirical
components, categorized blockchain-based companies
in their intentions to use blockchains, and conducted
semi-structured expert interviews to consequently derive blockchain governance characteristics and to contrast them to governance idealtypes.
As typical for exploratory research [43, 44], we
used all available sources to uncover interesting phenomena and derive appropriate concepts to describe
them. Specifically, we reviewed the still scarce, but
rapidly growing scientific body of work for reports on
blockchain governance, alongside scanning more than
six hundred sources for related materials obtained from
the blockchain research project Coding Value, as well
as research databases and search engines such as Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar among others. We utilized various search strings consisting of
‘blockchain’ and ‘governance’ to ensure a wider coverage of research domains, such as organizational and
social sciences. This initial step serves as a precondition to frame Powell’s and Demil and Lecocq’s classification of governance idealtypes and research on
blockchain governance characteristics from an academic standpoint. All publications without reference to
blockchains in use have been disregarded because outside of the scope of this work.
To complement our literature review from an academic side with practitioner’s intention to use blockchains, we also analyzed 126 blockchain-based companies from a variety of online sources like Crunchbase
and Coindesk for their governance characteristics.
Identifying relevant cases has proved a difficult task
because of the novelty of this domain and the hype that
wraps it. Indeed, there are countless startups, initiatives, GitHub projects, but few running implementations, which also causes empirically grounded research
to be scarce. In sum, our data collection is based on papers, practitioners’ reports, grey literature, specialized
press, blogs, as well as insights we gained from expert
interviews.
Through our search for blockchain-based companies, we found the most advanced application domains
to be (1) financial solutions, like wallets and payments,

5. Blockchain-based Land Registry
In the following, we present the business of authentication in the real-life domain of land registries.
Land registry received attention at the World Economic Forum [45], especially for the long time-span
that they must cover. Table 2 below lists the main cases
we found and their main references.
Table 2. Overview of found land registry cases
Case

Location

References

A

West Africa

[46, 47]

B

Caribbean

[48–50]

C

Scandinavia

[51–53]

D

Caucasus

[54, 55]

All these cases officially announced projects to
store and transfer records of land ownership via blockchain – some projects are already piloted and being
tested (A and C), other states already announced to join
(e.g. Dubai). Land registry and transfer of ownership,
historically, are perceived as bureaucratic and costly,
involving an authorized third party, e.g. notary services
and state bodies, to seal those transactions and to maintain the records for generations to come. The
bookkeeping often relies on paper-based documentation, which promises longevity and reliability. It comes
as no surprise that mostly, but not only, developing
countries put a special emphasis on this matter. Land
tenure is indeed seen as basic for further economic development, including financializing through collaterals. Assets as lands are both valuable and necessary,
thereby lucrative for fraud or corruption. Fraudulent
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renting, expropriations, extortion, and bribery are as
well documented as corruption in dealing with governmental or notary third parties [49, 54, 56].
In the case of A, a country in West Africa, the
blockchain project is part of an overall state digitization
initiative which aims at creating a novel eco-system,
connecting notaries, state, investors, and citizens. Land
records ambiguity and corruption have motivated this
initiative. Their implementation partner is active in
more than five countries and maintains more than one
thousand land records at the time of writing. This
blockchain-based solution is quite original: it authenticates transactions with proof-of-stake, which is faster
and cheaper than Bitcoin’s mining-intensive proof-ofwork. It also links its own tokens to both permissioned
and permissionless blockchains to leverage their different properties. In practice, to ensure the system’s resilience against tampering, each token is linked to Bitcoin
blockchain, whose scale guaranties proof-of-existence,
and a storage chain, where to save actual records data.
Responsible for data entry is a partnership between
state authorities and notaries, who can also modify
claimed contentious data and thereby acts as a single
‘point of truth’. The authentication of records therefore
partly relies both on open infrastructures and local actors (both state and private).
Case B targets a prototype in a Caribbean country
which can be considered as first-mover in blockchainbased land registry. Consistently with the idea that
blockchains may have positive effects where other
modes of governance encountered problems, this country has gone through decades of failed land reforms before trying this technology. The World Bank has been
active here for decades and this project can be seen a
recent development of a long-term international presence. The implementation partner is US-based and applies his offering to various domains beyond land registries, which means that, differently from case A, the
solution is less tailored onto the specific application
and the social context of use. Same as in case A, record
ambiguity and officials’ corruption were the main
driver for this initiative. Starting with a proof-of-concept in 2015, the project has been stalled shortly after
its announcements due to political issues (reelection)
and is currently regaining pace. Similarly, to case A,
the state of B remains the ‘single point of truth’ regarding data entry but it may have easier access to modification of records because all nodes of the permissioned
blockchain used, run, at the time of writing, on servers
belonging to a single organization. Originally, this
blockchain relies on proof-of-burn, which facilitates
the control on frequent changes of the records, also
traced on Bitcoin blockchain.
The project regarding case C in Scandinavia
started in 2016 and includes the state land registry office, a consultancy, a telecommunications provider, a
blockchain-based implementation partner, and financial institutions. Long term national efforts for the digitization of state services have been the main motivation for undertaking land registry and facilitate digital

and secure ownership transfers. At the time of writing,
the project finished its second test run. From a technical
perspective, data entry and changes are decided upon
by the state authority in a permissioned blockchain
which is embedded in the existing spatial data infrastructure, also comprising the cadaster. The authenticity of records is thereby solely dependent on the state
and its infrastructure, in contrast to case A and B, and
does therefore not rely on record maintenance provided
by independent miners like Bitcoin blockchain’s. The
goal to make information available to affiliated, authenticated parties is eased by the utilization of electronic ID’s provided by the telecommunication provider, and apparently in conformity to EU regulations.
The state of D, whose territory and sovereignty
have been under threat, is known for its e-government
efforts especially in collaboration with international
agencies. It partnered up in 2016 with a US-based implementation partner in order to increase land record
reliability. This implementation shows similar traits as
case A and B, relying on a permissioned blockchain
which is anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain using distributed digital timestamping. This might be particularly important in case of occupation. Still, the state,
again, remains responsible for these foundational data
entry, while the Bitcoin's proof-of-work assures data
integrity.

6. A Proposal for Tribal Governance
The domains of blockchains applications that we
considered (money transfer, intellectual property rights
management, supply chain monitoring), and the specific illustration provided above from land registries,
show some basic differences between blockchain governance and the bazaar idealtype (also refer to the
idealtypes in table 1):
• Contrary to open source licenses that prevent anyone
to appropriate the “matter of trade” (i.e. the developed software), public ledgers introduce authentication into digital settings. So we move from ‘carrots
and rainbows’ [20] to rivalry;
• While in FOSS projects the majority cannot enforce
its decisions onto everyone, because anyone can fork
their own version relying on publicly available code
at low cost while preserving their own use value, in
blockchain matters majority decisions are enforced
and forking poses substantial costs on all users;
• Cryptocurrencies or other built-in blockchain rewarding schemes affect people’s involvement not
least because they trade and hoard tokens. This is not
a feature of other FOSS projects;
• Derived from the previous points, blockchains manifest a level of mutually dependent interest, thus organizational togetherness, that the bazaar idealtype
does not accounts for.
The blockchain architecture thereby marks a paradigm shift in two ways: a) from traditional and centralized to digital and (currently) decentralized authentication method, and also b) from a digital gift economy
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• Thus, copyleft may affect but does not define blockchain-related governance and its capacity to mobilize human and technical resources, and also to commit them over long periods of time;
• Rather than as always under development product,
blockchains are better conceptualized as a means of
governance for what they authenticate and how.
These peculiar characteristics of blockchain governance, which diverges from the bazaar but does not
fall back into Powell’s threefold categorization substantiate our proposal for the ‘tribal governance’
idealtype. Reasons for referring to tribes are: they use
to have their own mode of governance which is not defined by the rule of law and enforced by states within
their territory; despite own rule, they use to interact
with societies regulated by formal laws, whose territories they often cross; they have charismatic chiefs but
the boundaries between inside and outside the tribe are
often vague [57].
Tribal governance can be well illustrated by land
registries. Swan [31], as much as our interviewees, are
aware that deploying blockchains as reliable records
for decades-long periods is not only a matter for software whose code is freely accessible in the future. In
fact, providing the required time longevity of records is
about ensuring from the beginning the persistence of a
functioning consensus mechanism (including hashing
power, stakes, etc. depending on the blockchain type).
Needless to say, compromised records would be catastrophic for national land and real estate records, with
so much of the economy anchored to them. In sum,
trust needs to be built far beyond software itself and its
code availability. In the cases of blockchains for land
registries, faceless trust needs to relate to identifiable
properties. Usually, notaries and state officers are in
charge of it. This raises up the questions of liability: if
there is no unique responsibility, who is liable when
something goes wrong? The awareness of those risks
manifests in the cases above, whose blockchains are
both linked to Bitcoin’s -by far the most reliable blockchain because its size and track record- and state records. However, this induces conflicts between modes
of governance: trust in the crowd (or better in the
‘tribe’) may not align with trust in the state (‘hierarchy’). If in 20 years an immutable blockchain records
a different owner for a piece of land than an old paper
certificate, what would a judge trust? What has legal
standing?
Descending from this sort of problems, it catches
the attention that bureaucracies -certainly a manifestation of hierarchical governance- are traditionally in
charge of authentication. This raises the interesting
question of how their functioning encounters and collides with blockchain tribal governance, which promises to perform the same function but relies on a possibly incompatible governance mode. Some of the aspects of this encounter emerge from the Estonian project of providing identity authentication also to non-Estonians, and even an own cryptocurrency Estcoin, rely-

to digital-only trades. This is new because before it, one
could only rely on credit money or had to do things for
free, trusting in a gift economy. A third option, i.e. both
digital native and paid directly, is allowed by distributed authentication of transactions, which introduces
rivalry in the digital environment. In other words, authentication allows an alternative to the gift economy
without having to rely on external guarantors.
While we maintain that digital modes of governance present substantial differences from previous
ones, we find the common emphasis on software reductive. The focus on FOSS as main empirical reference for the bazaar governance idealtype is limiting because it overemphasizes the production and development of software over its deployments, actual usages in
practice, and remarkable influence that maintainers
like miners exercise. Because of their functioning as
long term immutable ledgers, blockchains cannot be
designed, deployed, maintained, nor understood without considering their actual use and the tensions they
generate in real-life settings. Those phenomena manifest only at scale and when real interests are involved.
Lustig and Nardi [26] pose special attention onto
algorithms as defining aspect of Bitcoin, whereas we
argue that ledger’s maintainers and tokens’ users are
what characterize the governance of blockchain as
much as the other governance purposes it can be used
for. Indeed, beyond software development, the authenticity of the ledger is what maintainers guarantee and
users rely upon. Authenticity is not a straight product
of algorithms, but a sustained long-term effort that all
involved parties contribute to and depend upon. Beyond software developers, miners (or whoever maintains the ledger) and traders (or whoever uses the tokens for the most diverse purposes) gained a prominent
role in governance. These peculiarities (authentication
vs. infinite replicability, actual use at scale, long-term
timeframe) prompted us to propose ‘tribal governance’
as a new mode of governance, and to outline its cornerstones.
The broader and distributed resources that tribal
governance relies upon and shapes is not accounted for
by the bazaar idealtype and its sole focus on production, copyleft, and transaction cost. More precisely, the
digitalization of authentication functions usually performed by organizations reveals some limitations of
the bazaar idealtype (see also table 1 above):
• Rivalry originates a sense of togetherness which
FOSS does not have because exiting/forking is far
less damaging (at the same time this is not a ‘network’ in Powell’s terms because identities are not
fixed and membership is volatile);
• Its low control intensity does not apply because, even
if it remains true that blockchain software can be easily modified as any other FOSS, those changes are
not relevant for authentication until they substitute
the current software version run by miners and users;

Page 4491

8

Tribal Governance: The Business of Blockchain Authentication - Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) 2018

ing on blockchain [36]. The Estonian e-residency initiative [36] raises concerns regarding identity authentication and the possible consequences of displacing responsibilities. This is in line with the call for individual
accountability [5, 6]. Our initial empirical work
showed that the interactions between existing authorities and blockchain records are far from settled. For instance, there is no full scale and routinized land registration relying on blockchains. Rather, specific disputes are recorded on pilot blockchains in case they can
help court cases. This is particularly interesting in
countries based on the common law, where courts legislate through precedents.
Comparing bureaucracy and blockchain-based authentication, one can see remarkable differences. Especially important appear to be those about relying on private resources for providing a service of general interest (see Morabito [39]). It is certainly a concrete risk
that, if in the future public and private interests diverged, there would be no mandate nor legal basis to
force a faceless tribe of actors to act in the public interest. Since blockchain users, like skillful internet users
more generally, may operate with some level of anonymity across jurisdictions, bureaucracies are in short
of fit-for-purpose tools. Here the famous internet motto
“We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe
in: rough consensus and running code” points to a
mode of governance of an open-ended aggregate of actors –rather than of a defined citizenry/body politic –
through consensus.

clude unreliable authorities, thus reallocating elsewhere some traditional functions of hierarchies, markets and networks.
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